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Vacco v. Microsoft Corp.4/16/2002
This appeal raises two significant issues. First, as a matter of first impression, we must determine whether the plaintiff, Andrew Vacco, as an end user licensee of a software product manufactured by the defendant, Mircosoft Corporation, may maintain a claim against the defendant pursuant to the Connecticut Antitrust Act (Antitrust Act), General Statutes § 3524 et seq. Second, we must determine whether the plaintiff may maintain a claim, predicated on the same factual allegations underlying the antitrust claim, pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. We conclude that the plaintiff, as an indirect purchaser of the defendant's software product, may not recover under the Antitrust Act. We also conclude that the plaintiff is barred from bringing a claim under CUTPA because his alleged injuries are too remote with respect to the defendant's alleged conduct. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In September, 1999, the plaintiff purchased from a retail store in Wallingford an Intelbased personal computer onto which Windows 98 had been preinstalled. As a precondition to using Windows 98, the plaintiff was required to enter into an end user licensee agreement with the defendant specifying that Windows 98 was licensed, as opposed to sold, to the end user. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, alleging violations of the Antitrust Act and CUTPA. The gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is that the defendant wielded monopoly power in the computer operating systems market and, in wielding that power, ''knowingly licensed its Windows 98 operating system for Intel-based [personal computers] . . . without regard to competition, at a monopoly price in excess of what [the defendant] would have been able to charge in a competitive market.''
The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was an indirect purchaser of Windows 98 who was ineligible to recover under the Antitrust Act and who, in the absence of a cause of action under the Antitrust Act, also was ineligible to recover under CUTPA. The trial court agreed with the defendant and granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint. The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
I.
ANTITRUST ACT
The plaintiff first claims that the trial court, in applying Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 52 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1977) (Illinois Brick), improperly concluded that the plaintiff was an indirect purchaser of Windows 98 and, therefore, was barred from bringing an antitrust action pursuant to General Statutes § 35-35 to recover damages for the defendant's allegedly anticompetitive practices. We agree with the trial court.
Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff's claim, we set forth the standard of review applicable to an appeal challenging the trial court's granting of a motion to strike. ''A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court. As a result, our review of the court's ruling is plenary. Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 232-33, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S. Ct. 1106, 13
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